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Rupture in Kiev: 
Ukrainians Vote for Change to Consolidate 
Their Democracy by Cristina Gherasimov
The landslide victory of Volodymyr Zelenskiy in Ukraine’s presidential runoff is a 
breakthrough in the post-Soviet space that rarely offers chances to political novices. The 
vote highlights Ukrainians’ discontent with the political establishment. It shows a new 
set of factors at work in shaping the polls, and civil society’s readiness to accept risk to 
consolidate their fragile democracy. For the European Union and Germany, the change 
offers an opportunity for new momentum in relations with Ukraine.
In one of the most vibrant and unpredictable electoral 
contests in Ukrainian history, Volodymyr Zelenskiy won 
the presidential runoff by a landslide with 73.22 percent 
of votes, thus becoming the sixth president of Ukraine. 
Never before in Ukrainian history has a presidential can-
didate won in all but one region (Lviv) across the country. 
His victory signals a dynamic civil society which is ready 
to take on risks and endure more change to consolidate 
its fragile democracy. It is important to understand what 
caused this voter cohesion and mobilization, and what it 
means for Ukraine, the post-Soviet space, and the inter-
national community more broadly.
To do so adequately requires, at first, an understanding 
of the significance of the vote at this point in Ukraine’s de-
velopment. 2019 is a special year for Ukrainians: It hosts 
a double electoral race, for the presidency this spring 
and for parliament later this autumn. The presidential 
runoff completed the first electoral cycle after the 2013-14 
Euromaidan – a social upheaval, also called the Revolu-
tion of Dignity, which enshrined Ukraine’s popular choice 
to be part of the European Union one day. The election 
also marks five years since Russia occupied Ukraine’s 
Crimea and since the war against Russia-backed forces in 
eastern Ukraine’s Donbas region started. Ensuring that 
citizens can cast their votes in free and fair elections and 
that the transition of power takes place peacefully in such 
a difficult geopolitical context represented legitimate con-
cerns throughout this campaign, both for the Ukrainian 
government and the international community.
To understand the degree of change the new president 
could bring, it is also important to realize just how deeply 
Ukraine’s domestic reform agenda and its foreign policy 
are intertwined. Under Ukraine’s political system, the 
two key policies in the president’s purview are foreign 
policy and defense; other duties include naming the 
heads of the prosecution and the security services as well 
as the regional governors, and he also strongly influences 
the formal appointment of judges. Despite the Ukrainian 
president’s main focus on foreign policy, however, foreign 
and domestic policy have, in fact, been very much two 
sides of the same coin since the Euromaidan. For, Ukraine 
clearly defined European integration as its vector of 
foreign policy after the Euromaidan, and this immedi-
ately translated into a specific set of domestic policies: 
It brought on an agenda of political and socio-economic 
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reforms that is intended eventually to bring society closer 
to European norms and standards of living. 
The possible impact of the new presidency can, finally, 
only be seen in connection with the upcoming parliamen-
tary election, as the deep transformation into a consoli-
dated European democracy requires a strong partnership 
between the president and the parliament. At which 
pace the domestic change that Ukrainians voted for this 
Sunday can progress will depend on the outcome of the 
parliamentary polls: They will determine which parties 
will make it to parliament and how strong the support for 
Zelenskiy’s own Servant of the People party will be. 
Zelenskiy’s Victory: The Key Determinants 
Zelenskiy’s victory is a breakthrough for the post-Soviet 
space where political systems have mostly been too rigid to 
allow candidates from outside the political establishment 
to position themselves that high in the political echelons. 
It is usually only in periods of social upheavals or crises 
when such openings occur for political newcomers. As a 
result, one might have assumed that, five years after the 
Euromaidan, the momentum for such an opportunity had 
passed. However, a few factors explain Zelenskiy’s victory.
First, the context of fatigue and disillusionment with 
the pace of domestic reforms played in Zelenskiy’s favor. 
The 2013-2014 Revolution of Dignity brought into power 
a new leadership which promised to turn into reality the 
high expectations that followed the Euromaidan. The 
leadership under outgoing President Petro Poroshenko 
has genuinely achieved remarkable goals, such as the ne-
gotiated Ukraine-European Union Association Agreement, 
the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement with 
the EU, and a visa-free regime with the EU. Poroshenko 
also managed to create a strong international circle of 
friends who have been willing to stand for Ukraine’s ter-
ritorial integrity and democratic transformation. 
However, Poroshenko’s achievements in foreign policy 
have not been matched by major domestic advances. For 
the past five years, Ukrainians have been struggling with 
the socioeconomic consequences of a country torn by 
war, widespread corruption, and frustration over the lack 
of qualitative improvements to their lives. Many feel be-
trayed by how the government has been delivering on the 
reform agenda. According to a recent poll by the Rating 
Group Ukraine on behalf of the International Republican 
Institute (IRI), 70 percent of Ukrainians are dissatisfied 
with the direction their country has taken. The outcome 
of the presidential election is, therefore, one of protest 
and punishment: Ukrainians did not cast their ballots for 
but rather against someone – in this case, the Ukrainian 
political establishment. 
Second, by voting for a ‘new face’, Ukrainians ex-
pressed their longing for a new kind of politics and a new 
style of leadership. Paradoxically, however, Zelenskiy 
is a ‘new face’ that every Ukrainian already knows. In a 
popular TV series, The Servant of the People, he plays a 
humble and honest school teacher, Vasyl Holoborodko, 
who unexpectedly becomes president. During his term 
in office, his character fights against the intrinsic corrup-
tion within the Ukrainian political system. This idealized, 
integrative leadership style is what Ukrainians wish for. 
That Zelenskiy’s actual policy content and leadership 
style are big unknowns has, in this context, actually 
played to his advantage. It provided a content vacuum 
which allowed idealistic projections rather than provid-
ing a possibly disappointing realistic agenda. The blurred 
separation between fiction and reality contributed to 
an image transfer: Many Ukrainians cast their votes for 
who they want to see in Zelenskiy – the fictional teacher-
turned-president Holoborodko.   
Third, the campaign costs for Zelenskiy were not as 
high as for a regular newcomer as his media access gave 
him a jump-start compared to others who tried their 
odds in this election. New politicians usually find it very 
difficult to join high-level politics due to the increasing 
costs of campaigning. Access to the media is crucial as 
political advertising is a key cost in Ukrainian elections. 
The medium of television is of particular importance, as 
it still presents the most widely used and trusted source 
of news for Ukrainians, according to a 2018 survey on 
media consumption, carried out by Internews on behalf of 
the United States Agency for International Development 
(USAID). With his popular screen presence, Zelenskiy 
had a significant and double advantage in this regard: He 
was not only known to most Ukrainians via the television 
comedy that he authored and produced for more than 15 
years. Due to the positive connotation of his TV character, 
he also had direct access to their hearts. 
Fourth, no other candidate until this election used 
social media as actively and effectively as Zelenskiy did. 
Through his skillful political messaging, Zelenskiy ap-
pealed especially to younger Ukrainians who tend to be 
politically apathetic as they are unable to identify candi-
dates who represent their interests. Zelenskiy’s social me-
dia presence pressed his contenders also to increase their 
social media engagement and pushed the electoral cam-
paign to new digital heights. Despite the overall increase, 
however, there were marked differences in the quality of 
the social media usage. While Zelenskiy achieved an easy 
nonchalant style on Instagram, President Poroshenko’s 
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framing of political messages was much more formal, and 
appeared stiff and less appealing to Ukraine’s younger 
generation. 
In summary, Zelenskiy managed not only to aggregate 
the societal discontent that had accumulated under Poro-
shenko’s rule during the past five years. He also managed 
to embody Ukrainians’ hopes for a fairer Ukraine. These 
were infused partly by Zelenskiy’s fictional presence on 
television, which also put him at a financial advantage 
given the high costs of campaigning. And finally, he man-
aged to rally Ukraine’s youth by meeting and addressing 
them in the space and style they most frequent, i.e. social 
media. Sunday’s vote was one of rupture with the old and 
a call for change.
Sustaining Success: Zelenskiy’s Challenges 
Following his landslide victory, Zelenskiy will have to 
sustain his success, and several factors will determine 
his impact in this regard. Domestically, it is the extent to 
which he will manage to turn the period until the autumn 
parliamentary election to his advantage. As an outsider, 
he currently holds no political support in parliament, and 
it is also unclear whether and how his team will manage 
to maintain the momentum for his Servant of the People 
party until the polls. It is the parliamentary election 
which will, above all, determine the strength and politi-
cal support for Zelenskiy’s future actions as president. 
Moreover, by now there are clear indications that 
Zelenskiy and his campaign team have ties to Ukrai-
nian oligarch Ihor Kolomoisky, who suffered significant 
economic setbacks during Poroshenko’s presidency. It is 
not completely known yet to what extent this will result 
in dependencies for Zelenskiy. The degree of his entangle-
ment will determine with how much independence he 
will be able to exert his mandate. This will be crucial for 
his ability to meet citizens’ expectations that the presi-
dent decouple business interests from politics and move 
the reform agenda forward at the expense of entrenched, 
vested interests. 
A significant challenge also lies on the foreign policy 
front: In light of an ongoing war with a neighbor who has 
significantly stronger bargaining power, the political nov-
ice Zelenskiy will have to quickly build confidence and 
a strong rapport with the West. Many Western govern-
ments have already congratulated Zelenskiy on his vic-
tory and expressed continued support for Ukraine. Now, 
he needs to present himself as a credible and reliable 
partner to gain the trust of European governments, as 
President Poroshenko did during his incumbency. Despite 
the European Union’s positive first signals, this goal does 
not come without challenges: Given numerous competing 
challenges faced by the EU, Ukraine is frequently over-
looked today. It will be on Zelenskiy’s shoulders to get a 
front seat for Ukraine on the European agenda again.
The View from the West:  
Uncertainty and Expectations 
The international community, in turn, faces a significant 
level of uncertainty and, as a result, risk when it comes 
to Zelenskiy. As a newcomer to politics, he is not only 
inexperienced but has also been a dark horse through-
out the entire presidential race. He skillfully avoided 
content-related encounters such as interviews, debates, 
and meetings with journalists. Furthermore, he limited 
his interactions with foreign institutions. He has not yet 
clearly explained his agenda on key policy issues. Nor 
has he shared the names he considers for nominations 
and appointments for key state positions in his purview. 
This uncertainty, particularly regarding defense and 
security – key policies in the president’s mandate –, raises 
serious concerns among the international community, 
especially given that Ukraine is at war and has had its ter-
ritorial integrity repeatedly violated in the past five years. 
Ukraine’s difficult reform process is, furthermore, heav-
ily underpinned by international financial assistance. In 
this regard, too, it is key for international partners to be 
assured that the president-elect stands for continuity in 
Ukraine’s domestic reforms and foreign policy agenda.
Consolidating Ukraine’s democracy is also crucial 
to preserving its sovereignty. While Zelenskiy could be 
regarded a risk and there are plenty of reasons to be cau-
tious, there is much at stake after the election – not only 
for the West but, first and foremost, for Ukraine itself. 
Given the ongoing stand-off with Russia, the ultimate 
goal which Ukraine may have to pay, if it shows more 
signs of democratic backsliding rather than progress, is 
its territorial integrity, if not its sovereignty at large. Rus-
sian propaganda has already been exploiting Ukraine’s 
domestic vulnerabilities to portray it as a failed state and 
thereby seed doubt among Western partners. To counter 
such efforts, Zelenskiy has repeatedly expressed his com-
mitment to strengthen the rule of law and end the war in 
Donbas. The shared strong interest to maintain Ukraine’s 
stability and integrity could offer an opportunity and new 
momentum also for Brussels and Berlin to recommit to a 
fresh re-start for Ukraine.
Not engaging with the new president-elect is certainly 
not an option for the EU: This would send a wider signal 
that Brussels withdraws support from young democra-
cies in its Eastern neighborhood at a time when they are 
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constantly bullied by the Kremlin in their frail exercise 
of freedom and democracy. The result would be a more 
hawkish Russia willing to reassert its political dominance 
not only over Ukraine but over the entire post-Soviet 
space. The EU would face increasing instability at its 
Eastern border.
An Ambivalent Neighbor for Russia:  
Challenges and Chances 
While Zelenskiy’s presidency could be an opportunity for 
the EU and Germany to inject new progress on Donbas 
and the stalled structural reforms, he could become a 
growing problem for Russia. As a new and young charis-
matic leader, elected in a free and highly competitive vote 
and vowing to focus on ordinary Ukrainians’ domestic is-
sues, Zelenskiy stands in stark contrast to Vladimir Putin’s 
leadership at home. If Zelenskiy manages to deliver on 
citizens’ expectations and to build parliamentary support, 
this contrast might become even more aggravating for 
the Russian government; it would provide an alternative 
discourse to what the Kremlin promotes about Ukraine 
via its state-controlled media channels. When it comes 
to the war in Donbas, however, Zelenskiy’s inexperience 
plays to Russia’s advantage as political acumen is key to 
any conflict resolution. At this stage, therefore, Russia 
regards the newcomer with ambivalence: It is noteworthy 
that, while many Russian political figures have indirectly 
commented on the election result, Zelenskiy has not yet 
been officially congratulated on his victory.
What Zelenskiy’s victory ultimately shows is that 
civil society can fight back and punish its corrupt elites 
in post-Soviet states. It is not afraid to take on the risk 
of electing the politically inexperienced. Most of the 
determinants that pushed Zelenskiy upwards and toward 
his victory are present in other countries in the region as 
well: Low legitimacy of incumbents, high distrust in state 
institutions, widespread discontent with corrupt elites 
and stalled reform processes, a demand for new faces in 
politics, and an increased usage of social media to frame 
and deliver appealing political messages – all of these 
factors may bring more unexpected changes to the region. 
The EU needs to consider these underlying trends in order 
to strengthen its Eastern policy towards the region.
Dr. Cristina Gherasimov is Research Fellow at the Robert 
Bosch Center for Central and Eastern Europe, Russia, and 
Central Asia of the German Council on Foreign Relations 
(DGAP). 
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